Can Data-Driven Tax Governance Improve Corporate Tax Compliance? Evidence from China's Golden Tax Phase IV Reform
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/r062vn12Keywords:
Tax Compliance, Data-Driven Governance, Golden Tax Project, Information Asymmetry, Electronic Invoicing, Corporate Taxation, Deterrence TheoryAbstract
Based on the reform of the golden tax in China's Phase IV, this paper studies the relationship between data-driven tax governance and corporate tax compliance. These days, most tax authorities have begun to establish information systems for reduced information asymmetry and stronger enforcement. Theories supporting the research on tax compliance have explored the impact of the deterrent effect of the deterrent model and technology on the development of the system in depth. How the paper analyzes changes in the compliance system for large enterprises due to combined electronic invoicing and data sharing platforms. Evidence from China shows that all-encompassing digitalising has achieved reduced tax evasion; at the same time, it has altered corporate governance and internal reporting. The following are deficiencies in the analysis: the cost of compliance and possible capital misallocation. To advance tax administration reform under the conditions of economic opening-up, reduce enforcement pressure and boost economic vitality simultaneously.
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