Analysis and Improvement of Pricing Models for Bilateral Media Platforms
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/3t5jew36Keywords:
Two-sided platform, Pricing game, Consumer heterogeneity, Multi-homing behavior, Advertising mechanism, Model extensionAbstract
In the context of increasingly intense competition among digital platforms, the strategic pricing behavior of two-sided media platforms has attracted considerable academic attention. The pricing model for two-sided platforms proposed by Amaldoss et al. provides a theoretical foundation for understanding the interaction among consumer heterogeneity, multi-homing behavior, and advertising strategies. However, a series of idealized assumptions within the model present limitations when applied to real-world scenarios. This paper offers a systematic review and critical analysis of the model, identifying key issues in aspects such as consumer representation, advertiser behavior, platform strategy space, and market structure assumptions. Based on these insights, several extensions are proposed, including the introduction of continuous advertising aversion levels, endogenous attention allocation mechanisms, advertiser heterogeneity and budget constraints, asymmetric platform capabilities, and a dynamic game framework. Through structural modifications and mechanism enhancements, the model’s behavioral realism and practical explanatory power are significantly improved, offering valuable references for the development of platform pricing theory and its practical implementation.
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