Study on the Coordination Mechanism of Blockchain-Based Cross-Chain Traceability Systems for Food Supply Chains

Abstract

Addressing the issues of insufficient information sharing and low coordination efficiency in food supply chain cross-chain traceability, this study proposes a coordination mechanism based on blockchain technology. We innovatively construct a Stackelberg game model consisting of a "pork supply chain" (upstream) and a "frozen dumpling supply chain" (downstream). By introducing the concept of the "cost threshold effect," we quantify the critical conditions for investment in blockchain technology and propose, for the first time, a "Blockchain Technology Investment Decision Matrix" to define the technical adaptation boundaries under various cost-preference combinations. Numerical simulations validate the effectiveness of blockchain in reducing inventory costs for the upstream supply chain and expanding the potential market for the downstream supply chain. The findings reveal a significant cost threshold for blockchain application and suggest that enterprises should dynamically adjust investment strategies based on a dual-dimensional "cost-preference" framework—for instance, prioritizing deployment for high-value-added products or sharing costs through consortium chains for SMEs. This research provides a theoretical framework for coordination mechanisms and empirical evidence for government subsidy policies and corporate investment optimization.