Financial Deepening, Credit Behavior and Credit Efficiency: Evidence from Urban Commercial Banks in China
DOI:
https://doi.org/10.54097/qmp2bp06Keywords:
Financial deepening, Credit behavior, Credit efficiency, Urban commercial banksAbstract
In recent years, China's banking sector has experienced significant financial deepening and structural transformation. Urban commercial banks, as an important component of the financial system, play a crucial role in allocating financial resources and supporting regional economic development. This paper examines the relationship between financial deepening, bank credit behavior, and credit efficiency using data from urban commercial banks in China. The study analyzes how financial deepening influences credit allocation and improves credit efficiency through changes in banks’ lending behavior. The results suggest that financial deepening significantly enhances credit efficiency by improving information transparency, strengthening competition, and optimizing credit allocation. Meanwhile, credit behavior acts as an important transmission mechanism through which financial deepening affects credit efficiency. The findings provide policy implications for improving financial reforms and strengthening the role of urban commercial banks in economic development.
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